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Abstract 
Fiscal policymakers are expected to conduct countercyclical policies to mitigate cyclical fluctuations 
of output, but the assessment of cyclical conditions in real time is subject to considerable 
uncertainty. They face two types of risk: (i) launching discretionary measures to support or dampen 
aggregate demand when no measures are required (type I error), or (ii) not launching any stabilising 
measures when this is warranted by cyclical conditions (type II error). A rational policymaker could 
manage these risks by correcting real-time estimates for past errors, notably the apparent tendency 
to underestimate good times when they occur. In practice, however, fiscal policy has been largely 
pro-cyclical or a-cyclical at best. Using statistical decision theory, we calculate thresholds for real-
time output gap estimates beyond which governments could launch stabilisation measures, so as to 
reduce the risk of running pro-cyclical policies. We consider different preferences for avoiding type I 
or type II errors, and for addressing upside and downside growth risks. We show that the tendency to 
run pro-cyclical fiscal policy and the ensuing deficit bias can reflect two factors: a preference for 
activism that is, attaching a lower cost to type I errors, combined with an inclination to be gloomy 
about cyclical conditions. 
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1. Introduction 
Fiscal policy decisions crucially depend on the assessment of the economic cycle. In line with the 
stabilisation function of fiscal policy, governments are expected to prop up or dampen demand when 
there are signs of slack or overheating in the economy. However, determining the state of the 
business cycle in real time is an inherently difficult exercise for two reasons. First, such an 
assessment requires accurate forecasts about forthcoming economic developments. Second, 
determining the position of the economy along the cycle requires knowing the level of potential 
output, which is unobservable. Consequently, conventional measures of the output gap are 
surrounded by a significant degree of uncertainty. Rather than taking at face value point estimates 
available in real time, fiscal policymakers could carry out a risk assessment taking into account past 
errors.  
This paper deals with the challenges related to performing such a risk assessment in real time, and 
the trade-off it involves. In particular, we illustrate the decision of fiscal policymakers as they attempt 
to balance two types of errors. The first error is associated with the incorrect belief that the economy 
is far from its potential, which leads the government to use actively fiscal policy for stabilisation 
purposes although it is not justified by actual economic conditions (type I error). Conversely, the 
second error is associated with the incorrect assessment that the economy is near its potential when 
it is in fact falling short of it or exceeding it; this assessment would lead the government to adopt a 
neutral fiscal stance while a counter-cyclical stance would be more appropriate (type II error). We 
employ statistical decision theory to describe the optimal real-time decision which minimises the 
expected loss associated with these two types of error.  
Using real-time output gap estimates for 28 EU countries between 2003 and 2017, we find a 
tendency to underestimate economic good times in real time, which in hindsight is one of the drivers 
of pro-cyclical fiscal policies. The tendency to be too pessimistic about the cycle turns out to be more 
marked for the production function approach used for EU fiscal surveillance. A lower bias is observed 
for forecasts based on the agnostic Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter. We also show how a rational fiscal 
policymaker could avert the risk of pro-cyclical policies by exploiting past information. We argue that, 
on top of genuine uncertainty, pro-cyclical policies observed in the past can be presented as the 
result of policy makers (i) not being concerned about the costs of activism, i.e. intervening when 
there is no need, and (ii) having a greater aversion to being too optimistic than pessimistic. While 
such a behaviour or preference may be politically understandable in the short term, it leads to an 
accumulation of debt over the long term with all its negative implications.  
The remainder of this paper is as follows. Section 2 summarises the issues raised in the literature on 
fiscal policy and stabilisation. Section 3 illustrates how timely information and measurement errors in 
real-time estimates of the output gap matter when assessing the cyclical behaviour of fiscal policy. 
Section 4 presents the data and identifies a number of stylised facts. Section 5 conducts an empirical 
analysis on output gap forecast errors and indicates for what values of the output gap the 
government should consider using fiscal policy to stabilise the economy, depending on its 
preferences over the risks involved. 
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2. Fiscal policy and the business cycle 
Traditionally, one of the three main objectives of fiscal policy is to stabilise the economy along its 
potential output (Musgrave (1959)). When economic activity falls short of its potential, the 
government should undertake an expansionary fiscal stance to support real demand; conversely, the 
government should compress demand and build fiscal buffers when output is above potential. The 
economic argument for doing so is that, from an economic perspective, there are welfare losses 
associated to both episodes of downturn and overheating. 
In practice, numerous studies have observed that countries often pursue pro-cyclical policies. Gavin 
and Perotti (1997) first noted that fiscal policy in Latin American countries tends to be pro-cyclical; 
Talvi and Vegh (2005) and Kaminski, Reinhart and Vegh (2005) noted that pro-cyclical fiscal policies 
are typical of many developing countries. For developed countries, Lane (2003) shows varying 
degrees of pro-cyclicality, with countries with more volatile output and dispersed political power 
more likely to run pro-cyclical policies. Maravalle and Claeys (2012) arrive at a similar result by 
adding a fiscal rule to a standard RBC model that allows public spending to follow the cycle. Finally, 
OECD (2003) shows that developed countries tend to have a counter-cyclical fiscal stance during 
downturns and a pro-cyclical stance during upturns. In short, a substantial empirical literature shows 
quite convincingly that the actual fiscal policy implemented by governments may not be optimal. In 
particular, there seems to be a common tendency towards a deficit bias during upturns, when the 
government budget constraint is less binding, hence a pro-cyclical policy during good times (Beetsma 
and Giuliodori (2010)).  
Many of the early studies that analyse the cyclicality of policy decisions make use of ex-post data. 
Orphanides (2001) and Orphanides and van Norden (2002) were the first to claim that unrealistic 
assumptions about the timeliness of data availability may lead to incorrect conclusions about 
policymakers' behaviour. Orphanides (2003) provides an analytical framework to assess the level of 
noise present in data available in real-time. The framework provides evidence that when the noise is 
taken into account, policy actions are better in stabilising the economy. Extending this analysis to 
fiscal policy and looking at OECD countries, Cimadomo (2012) shows that, while fiscal policy appears 
to be pro-cyclical when evaluated ex-post, the fiscal stance appears counter-cyclical when assessed 
on the basis of real-time data which is available to the government when decisions are made. 
Golinelli and Momigliano (2006) also find evidence that the policies of euro countries largely react in 
a counter-cyclical way when evaluated in real-time. Gollinelli and Momigliano (2009) survey the 
recent empirical literature concerning the cyclicality of fiscal policies in the euro area, and they find 
that the results are heavily affected by the data vintage used in the analysis of the fiscal policy 
reactions. Hughes Hallett et al. (2007) show that real-time estimates of the cyclically-adjusted budget 
balance are subject to significant revisions ex-post, and that this lack of accuracy may explain why 
some fiscal slippages go unnoticed in real time. 
These results suggest that a predominant factor in determining a suboptimal fiscal policy in advanced 
economies lies in informational problems. Lack of timely information is due to the significant lags 
associated to policymaking, which are particularly acute in the case of fiscal policy. First of all, there is 
a lag in the availability of data: GDP figures, for instance, are only available on a quarterly basis and 
they are subject to significant revisions. A second source of lag is caused by the budgeting process: 
the government must prepare a budget law, or an update to it, which then needs to go through 
 3 
 
parliament. Third, there is an implementation lag: for tax measures this depends on the date when 
the new tax laws apply, while for expenditure measures this depends on the time it takes to 
effectively disburse the money. Fourth, there is a transmission lag, namely the time it takes for fiscal 
impulses to propagate throughout the economy and affect the decisions of households and firms. 
As a way of example, the substantial nature of these policy lags can be roughly quantified for the 
euro area, where fiscal policies are closely coordinated under the Stability and Growth Pact. The draft 
budgets of euro area countries for a given year t have to be prepared by 15 October of year t-1. This 
implies that the latest available information on economic conditions which is factored in by the 
government refers to the third quarter of year t-1. The realised level of economic activity for year t is 
observed only ex-post, at the end of the first quarter of year t+1. The overall information lag for 
policymakers can therefore be roughly quantified around one year and a half, which implies the 
possibility of significant forecast errors. Policymakers are therefore left to take decisions under a 
substantial degree of uncertainty, and how to deal with such uncertainty is not straightforward. For 
instance, with reference to monetary policy, Brainard’s principle suggests that policymaker should 
behave conservatively in the face of uncertainty (see Brainard 1997), but more recent results suggest 
that an aggressive response to uncertainty may be optimal under some circumstances (see 
Söderström 2002). 
An additional element of uncertainty regards the timing and effectiveness of fiscal policy in stabilising 
the economy. On the one hand, neoclassical models suggest that fiscal multipliers are rather small, 
especially as households internalise the government’s budget constraint and smooth their 
consumption by accessing credit markets (Baxter and King (1993)). On the other hand, Keynesian 
models predict that price rigidities and liquidity constraints lead to a positive response of private 
consumption to an increase in government spending, giving rise to sizeable fiscal multipliers (Galí, 
López-Salido and Vallés (2007)). A number of recent studies confirm that the impact of fiscal policy 
on output is state dependent: Auerbach and Gordonichenko (2017) show that government spending 
shocks have a negligible impact during expansions, but a sizeable one during recessions when 
frictions impair the functioning of e.g. credit markets. While the size of fiscal multipliers does not 
affect per se the discussion on the pro-cyclicality of fiscal policy, the composition of fiscal policy does, 
as the effect of different fiscal measures on the economy may materialise at different times. A fiscal 
stimulus may thus be counter-cyclical at the time it is decided, but by the time its effect on output 
becomes noticeable, it may turn out to be pro-cyclical. 
Beyond pure uncertainty, the use of information and fiscal slippages may also reflect strategic 
motives. An extensive economic literature suggests that discretionary fiscal policy suffers from a 
deficit bias. Calmfors and Wren-Lewis (2011) identify a number of reasons to explain this bias. First, 
there are information asymmetries on the part of voters, which could be exploited by the 
government to boost its chances of re-election election – for instance, governments may have an 
incentive to embellish the economic outlook to distort voters’ perceptions of the state of the 
economy (Jonung and Larch (2006), Frankel and Schreger (2013)). Second, electoral competition may 
cause governments to not fully internalise the cost of issuing debt, because these costs may be borne 
by the opposition if the government is not re-elected. This burden is then passed on to future 
generations, which are saddled with higher levels of debt and possibly lower levels of capital. Finally, 
common-pool theory suggests that policy makers often fail to internalise the overall cost of debt on 
the budget when policy actions only target small groups.  
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In this paper, we consider the case of a policymaker which does not engage in this kind of strategic 
behaviour. He or She genuinely wishes to pursue a counter-cyclical policy, but is stymied by a lack of 
adequate information in real-time. Taking into account past forecast errors on the output gap, the 
policymaker takes fiscal decisions based on its preferences over two factors: (i) the trade-off 
between taking incorrect decisions and failing to act, and (ii) the degree of aversion to downward 
growth surprises. 
 
3. Real-time fiscal policy as a risk management exercise 
Assuming that a policymaker wishes to pursue a counter-cyclical fiscal stance, this section discusses 
the informational problem faced by the government. Policymakers have to base their decision on a 
real-time assessment of the state of the economy, which is inevitably prone to error. Fiscal policy 
decisions need to balance the risks associated with two types of errors: the first error consists in 
implementing policies believed to be counter-cyclical while the economy is actually near its potential 
(type I error); the second error consists in adopting a neutral fiscal stance when the economy is far 
from its potential, while this would call for stabilisation policies (type II error). 
We assume that the economy can be characterised by three different states. When output is close to 
its potential, the economy is said to be in ‘normal times’; when output is significantly below or above 
potential, the economy will be in ‘bad times’ or in ‘good times’, respectively. In line with the existing 
literature, we consider the output gap as an overall indicator of the economic cycle. Therefore, 
denoting as ߱௧ the state of the economy in year ݐ, and assuming that output is close to potential 
when the distance between the two is less than half a percent of potential GDP1, the values of ߱௧ will 
be as follows: 
(1)     ߱௧ = ቐ
 ′ܾܽ݀ ݐ݅݉݁ݏ′      ݂݅     ܱܩ௧ < −0.5%
                ′݊݋ݎ݈݉ܽ ݐ݅݉݁ݏᇱ    ݂݅    − 0.5% < ܱܩ௧ < +0.5%
′݃݋݋݀ ݐ݅݉݁ݏᇱ     ݂݅     ܱܩ௧ > +0.5%
 
The decision of the government consists in setting the fiscal stance, i.e. the discretionary change of 
the budget balance, for year ݐ. In broad qualitative terms, we consider that the fiscal stance can be of 
three types: an improvement in the budget balance, which represents a fiscal consolidation; a 
deterioration in the budget balance, which corresponds to a fiscal stimulus; and an unchanged 
budgetary position, i.e. a neutral fiscal stance. In this problem we will not discuss the size of the 
appropriate fiscal stance, but merely whether the stance is expansionary, restrictive or neutral. 
Assuming that policymakers intend to pursue a counter-cyclical fiscal stance, the government’s 
reaction function is characterised as follows: 
(2)         ݎ(߱௧) = ቐ
′ݏݐ݅݉ݑ݈ݑݏ′          ݂݅    ߱௧ = ′ܾܽ݀ ݐ݅݉݁ݏ′
       ′݊݁ݑݐݎ݈ܽ′            ݂݅    ߱௧ = ′݊݋ݎ݈݉ܽ ݐ݅݉݁ݏ′
′ܿ݋݊ݏ݋݈݅݀ܽݐ݅݋݊′   ݂݅    ߱௧ = ′݃݋݋݀ ݐ݅݉݁ݏ′
 
                                                          
1 An interval of 1% of GDP, centred on zero, aims at capturing the uncertainty about when the economy is at its 
potential. It is in line with the length of the confidence interval of output gap estimates under both the 
production function method and the HP filter. 
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The problem faced by the government is that the true state of the economy for the upcoming fiscal 
year ݐ, ߱௧, is unknown when budgetary decisions need to be taken in year ݐ − 1. Determining the 
true state of the economy requires both estimating the level of potential output, which is 
unobservable, and measuring economic growth in the following year, which is still unknown. The 
only information available to the government in ݐ − 1 is a real-time assessment of the cycle, ߱௧ோ. We 
assume that ߱௧ோ is determined on the basis of the real-time estimate of the output gap, ܱܩ௧ோ, which 
is based on an estimate of the level of potential output and a forecast of the level of GDP in the 
following year. The real-time assessment of the cycle is therefore as follows: 
(3)     ߱௧ோ = ቐ
 ′ܾܽ݀ ݐ݅݉݁ݏ′        ݂݅     ܱܩ௧ோ < ߬ଵ
     ′݊݋ݎ݈݉ܽ ݐ݅݉݁ݏᇱ      ݂݅    ߬ଵ ≤ ܱܩ௧ோ ≤ ߬ଶ
′݃݋݋݀ ݐ݅݉݁ݏᇱ       ݂݅     ܱܩ௧ோ > ߬ଶ
 
where ߬ଵ and ߬ଶ identify the thresholds that the government uses to determine the state of the 
economy in real time, taking into account errors in the real-time output gap. The government will set 
the fiscal stance on the basis of its belief on the state of the economy according to the following real-
time decision function: 
(4)         ݀(߱௧ோ) = ቐ
′ݏݐ݅݉ݑ݈ݑݏ′             ݂݅    ߱௧ோ = ᇱܾܽ݀ ݐ݅݉݁ݏ′
          ′݊݁ݑݐݎ݈ܽ′             ݂݅    ߱௧ோ = ᇱ݊݋ݎ݈݉ܽ ݐ݅݉݁ݏ′
′ܿ݋݊ݏ݋݈݅݀ܽݐ݅݋݊′      ݂݅    ߱௧ோ = ᇱ݃݋݋݀ ݐ݅݉݁ݏ′
 
Due to the errors in real-time estimates of the output gap, the real-time decision ݀(߱௧ோ) may be 
different from the desired reaction ݎ(߱௧). Whenever this happens, the government suffers a loss 
ܮ(݀(߱௧ோ), ݎ(߱௧)). The government aims to find the real-time decision function that minimises the 
loss, i.e. the pair of thresholds (߬ଵ, ߬ଶ) that minimises the difference between the real-time 
assessment of the cycle, ߱௧ோ, and the true state of the cycle, ߱௧. In hindsight, taking the latest 
available estimate of the output gap as a proxy for the true state of the economy, the government 
can infer from past observations the conditional probability ܲ(߱௧ோ|߱௧) and the prior probability 
ߨ(߱௧), and retrieve the optimal real-time decision function.  
For a given state of the economy ߱௧, the expected loss (i.e. the risk) associated with a particular 
decision function ݀ is: 
(5)         ܴ(݀, ߱௧) = ܧ ቂܮቀ݀(߱௧ோ), ݎ(߱௧)ቁቃ = ෍ ܮቀ݀(߱௧ோ), ݎ(߱௧)ቁܲ(߱௧ோ|߱௧)
∀ைீೃ
 
The optimal decision function is the one with the lowest expected risk across the various states ߱௧: 
(6)         ݀∗ = arg minௗ ܧሾܴ(݀, ߱௧)ሿ = arg minௗ ෍ ܴ(݀, ߱௧)∀ைீ
ߨ(߱௧)
= arg minௗ ෍ ෍ ܮቀ݀(߱௧
ோ), ݎ(߱௧)ቁܲ(߱௧ோ|߱௧)ߨ(߱௧)
∀ఠ೟ೃ∀ఠ೟
 
Table 1 outlines the possible situations that can materialise. 
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Table 1: Possible outcomes 
   Real-time decision of the government ݀(߱௧ோ) 
   Stimulus Neutral Consolidation 
   ܱܩ௧ோ < ߬ଵ ߬ଵ ≤ ܱܩ௧ோ ≤ ߬ଶ ܱܩ௧ோ > ߬ଶ 
Reaction 
desired 
ex-post 
ݎ(߱௧) 
Stimulus ܱܩ௧ < −0.5% Correct action Incorrect inaction (type II error) 
Incorrect action 
(type I error) 
Neutral −0.5% ≤ ܱܩ௧ ≤ 0.5% Incorrect action(type I error) Correct inaction 
Incorrect action 
(type I error) 
Consolidation ܱܩ௧ > 0.5% Incorrect action(type I error) 
Incorrect inaction 
(type II error) Correct action 
 
4. Data 
In this paper, we use output gap estimates for 28 countries in the European Union between 2003 and 
2017 (Table 2). We consider two measures of the output gap as estimated by the European 
Commission. The first one compares actual GDP to potential GDP, while the other compares it to 
trend GDP. In the first approach, the European Commission estimates potential output using a 
production function approach, a method which was endorsed by the ECOFIN Council in 2002 (Havik 
et al. (2014)). This approach consists in estimating first the potential levels of labour, capital and total 
factor productivity, and then combining these results via a Cobb-Douglas production function to 
derive the corresponding level of potential output. In the second approach, by contrast, the 
Commission derives the output gap from trend GDP as calculated using an HP filter with a smoothing 
coefficient of 100. 
Table 2: Sample of output gap estimates 
Austria 
Belgium 
Bulgaria 
Cyprus 
Czech Republic 
Germany 
Denmark 
Estonia 
Greece 
Spain 
Finland 
France 
Croatia 
Hungary 
2003-2017 
2005-2017 
2008-2017 
2005-2017 
2005-2017 
2003-2017 
2003-2017 
2005-2017 
2003-2017 
2003-2017 
2003-2017 
2003-2017 
2013-2017 
2005-2017 
Ireland 
Italy 
Lithuania 
Luxembourg 
Latvia 
Malta 
The Netherlands 
Poland 
Portugal 
Romania 
Sweden 
Slovenia 
Slovakia 
United Kingdom 
2003-2017 
2003-2017 
2005-2017 
2005-2017 
2005-2017 
2005-2017 
2003-2017 
2005-2017 
2003-2017 
2008-2017 
2003-2017 
2005-2017 
2005-2017 
2003-2017 
To measure of the real-time state of the economy ߱௧ோ in a given year t, we consider output gap 
estimates from the Commission’s autumn forecast of year t-1. This estimate is usually published in 
November and proxies the information available to the government at the time when the budget 
was drafted. To measure the true state of the economy ߱௧ in year t, we consider output gap 
estimates which were released by the Commission in its spring 2018 forecast, as it includes the latest 
available information.  
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We use European Commission forecasts because they provide four important advantages. First, the 
methodology is the same for all Member States, allowing us to pool together the estimates of the 
different countries. Second, due to the important role of output gap estimates in EU fiscal 
surveillance, the methodology employed by the European Commission to generate these estimates is 
specifically tailored for their policy use. For this reason, Commission estimates of the output gap tend 
to be less susceptible to ex-post revisions than estimates from other institutions. This implies that 
the type I and type II errors that we assess based on this dataset will be less prominent compared to 
what would appear using alternative sources, such as national Ministries. Third, Commission 
forecasts are performed independently from national governments, and therefore arguably do not 
suffer from the type of strategic bias which is often observed in government forecasts (Jonung and 
Larch, 2006; Frankel and Schreger, 2013; Fioramanti et al., 2016). Finally, the production of 
Commission forecasts is linked to the EU economic policy surveillance cycle, and therefore the 
release of the autumn forecast is synchronised with the preparation of budget laws in EU Member 
States; this makes it a good proxy of the information available to governments at that time2. Table 3 
provides summary statistics for the chosen sample.  
Table 3: Summary statistics for the output gap by vintage and measure 
Output gap measure Obs. Mean Std. dev. Min Max 
Real-time PF 378 -1.42 2.10 -14.36 3.44 
HP 380 -0.91 2.00 -12.07 5.89 
Ex-post PF 420 -0.44 3.52 -15.01 14.01 
HP 420 0.11 4.06 -12.79 20.31 
Note: European Commission estimates using the production function (PF) approach or the 
HP filter (HP). 
 
5. Empirical analysis 
This section aims to determine whether the real-time estimates of the output gap are biased, and to 
characterise how the government should set its fiscal stance in real time depending on available 
information about the output gap and a balance of risks. 
5.1 Forecast bias in real-time estimates of the output gap 
Real-time estimates of the output gap are subject to two sources of uncertainty: the uncertainty 
associated with forecasts of GDP growth, and the model uncertainty underlying the estimates of 
potential GDP. The latter is particularly significant, because potential output is unobservable, and its 
estimated value can be significantly revised even several years into the future. Moreover, 
conventional methodologies to estimate potential output may be distorted by cyclical factors (see 
Coibion et al. 2017).  
                                                          
2 A change of accounting standards from ESA95 to ESA2010 affects the estimate of output levels across time, 
but this has a proportional impact on potential output: the effect on the estimate of the output gap is 
therefore negligible. The impact of changes in the methodology to calculate potential output is discussed in 
footnote 4. 
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Over the time horizon considered, both the real-time output gap estimate based on the production 
function methodology and the one based on the HP filter display significant forecast errors, and the 
average forecast error is negative (Figure 1). This would suggest that real-time estimates of the 
output gap tend to overstate the size of economic downturns and to understate booms. 
Policymakers who take real-time output gaps at face value would therefore be prone to significant 
policy errors: they would fail to build up adequate fiscal buffers during good times and they would 
tend to provide excessive support to the economy during bad times. In line with the findings 
discussed in Section 2, this suggests that government policies may be too pro-cyclical during good 
times. In this case, however, this behaviour would not be the result of poor incentives for 
policymakers giving rise to a deficit bias, but it would rather follow from an informational problem, 
where policymakers fail to take into account the risks of making decisions based on real-time data. 
Figure 1: Distribution of output gap forecast errors based on potential output and trend output 
 
Note: Forecast errors refers to the difference between the Commission autumn forecast in year t-1 for year t and the ex-
post estimate of the same year t from the Commission 2017 autumn forecast, for EU countries between 2003 and 2017. 
Source: European Commission 
One possible cause for the pessimistic bias in real-time estimates of the output gap may lie in the 
methodologies commonly employed to estimate potential output. In broad terms, the concept of 
potential output refers to the level of economic activity which is sustainable over the medium term 
and consistent with full employment. From an empirical perspective, this concept of economic 
sustainability is frequently associated with the idea that potential output is the level of activity which 
leads to stable prices, or to non-accelerating wage costs. Price and cost developments therefore play 
a key role in identifying potential output, for instance via the NAWRU, thereby remedying the 
problem of its non-observability. However, as recent experience has shown, the accumulation of 
large financial imbalances may lead to an unsustainable trajectory for output which does not 
necessarily result in inflationary pressure. Borio et al. (2017) shows that conventional methods for 
the estimation of potential output may fail to capture cyclical swings in economic activity which are 
due to the financial cycle. During a build-up of financial imbalance, a real-time assessment of the 
cycle may therefore point to a near-zero output gap even though the economy is operating above 
capacity. At the same time, in the immediate aftermath of a financial correction, the output gap may 
point to an overly pessimistic view of the cycle under the assumption that the pre-crisis peak 
represented the ‘true’ level of potential output to which the economy needs to converge. This 
incorrect assessment of the underlying level of potential output would lead to a negative bias in 
output gap estimates in real-time. 
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Following Theil (1966), we test the existence of a forecast bias in real-time output gap estimates by 
running the following regression: 
(7)        (ܱܩ௧௥ − ܱܩ௧) =  ߙ +  ߝ௧ 
We then test the null hypothesis that ߙ = 0. Table 4 presents the results for the full sample and for a 
variety of sub-samples. 
Table 4: Output gap forecast bias 
 Output gap measure 
 Production function approach HP filter 
Sample Average bias Observations Average bias Observations 
Full sample -0.80*** 378 -0.94*** 380 
Pre-crisis years (2003-2008) -2.74*** 130 -3.26*** 132 
Crisis years (2009-2017) 0.22* 248 0.29** 248 
Years with positive output gap -2.49*** 157 -2.86*** 158 
Years with negative output gap 0.40*** 221 0.42*** 222 
All years excluding recessions -1.36*** 308 -1.28*** 310 
Years of recession 1.66*** 70 0.54 70 
Years with negative output gap but no 
recession -0.28** 161 0.06 162 
Crisis years (2009-2017) excluding recessions -0.43*** 189 -0.01 189 
Note: ***Significant at 1% ; ** Significant at 5% ; * Significant at 10%. 
In the full sample, both the output gap based on the production function methodology and the one 
based on the HP filter display a sizeable and statistically significant negative bias. With few 
exceptions, all countries display a negative average forecast error for the real-time output gap, both 
with the production function methodology and the HP filter. 3 Hence the bias is an issue for both 
individual countries and the aggregate, including in particular the euro area.  The behaviour of the 
two series is however different over the business cycle. During years of recession, the production 
function method displays a positive and significant forecast bias. This is not particularly surprising, 
since recessions are usually difficult to predict: in this case, the error is therefore largely due to 
growth forecasts, not to estimates of potential GDP. In these periods, the HP-filter estimates also 
display a positive error on average, but it is not statistically significant. Outside recession years, the 
output gap based on the production function method shows a negative and significant bias, both 
when the output gap is positive and when it is negative, although in the latter case the bias is much 
smaller. This suggests that the production function methodology has a general tendency to be too 
pessimistic, and that this problem is particularly severe during upturns. By contrast, with the HP-filter 
approach, we only find a negative bias when the output gap is positive. When the output gap is 
negative, outside of recession years, there appears to be no forecast error.  
                                                          
3 When the production function method is considered, Greece, Croatia and Romania are the only countries 
where the average forecast error is positive, but not statistically significant. When the HP-filter is considered, 
Croatia, Malta and Poland are the only countries where the average forecast error is positive, but not 
statistically significant. 
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Overall, these findings confirm that conventional measures of the output gap are too cautious during 
good economic times, by failing to capture episodes of credit booms and overheating in real time, 
such as during the years up to the 2007 financial crisis. Conversely, an ‘optimistic bias’ emerges 
during bad economic times, which is however entirely driven by recession years. During phases of 
economic recovery, when the economy is not in recession but the output gap is still negative, the HP 
filter however tends to be more symmetric, while the production function approach remains too 
pessimistic4. This last result may stem from the fact that potential output estimates from the HP filter 
tend to be more pro-cyclical than those from the production function method. Since the Great 
Recession was characterised by a permanent negative shock to output, the HP filter was better 
suited to capture a downward revision in potential output. Indeed, looking at aggregate data for the 
European Union, the HP-filtered potential output began to immediately decline after 2006, relative 
to pre-crisis trend; the production function method, on the other hand, continued to suggest that 
potential growth was broadly in line with the pre-crisis trend still in 2008 (see Figure 2).  
Figure 2: Potential output estimates using the production function 
method and the HP filter 
 
Source: European Commission, based on ex-post data. 
 
5.2 Optimal fiscal stance for the government 
In this section, we look at how the different properties of the two real-time measures of the output 
gap impact the risk-management problem of the government. We derive the optimal real-time 
decision function of the government on the basis of a qualitative loss function, which simply 
considers whether the decision to implement either a neutral or a counter-cyclical fiscal stance is 
                                                          
4 The Commission methodology for calculating potential output was updated in 2014: for earlier years, the 
forecast error considered in this paper therefore compares output gap estimates under two slightly different 
methodologies. This update of methodology had however a negligible impact on the output gap estimates of 
most countries, with the exception of Spain, Croatia, Cyprus and Portugal (see European Commission 2014). 
When these countries are excluded from the tests in Table 4, the findings are broadly unchanged: a negative 
bias of -0.83*** emerges under the full sample, a bias of  -2.5*** emerges under the sample with only positive 
output gaps and a bias of -0.25** emerges in the sample with only negative output gaps but excluding 
recessions. 
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broadly correct, in light of ex-post information about the cycle. We consider that the government 
suffers a loss equal to ℓ every time the decision taken is incorrect. We further assume that the loss is 
double, 2ℓ, whenever the government confuses an expansion with a downturn, or vice versa. We 
then consider that the government attaches a weight of ߠ ∈ ሾ0,1ሿ to an incorrect action, which 
would occur whenever the government decides to implement a counter-cyclical fiscal stance when a 
neutral stance would have been appropriate (type I error). The government attaches a weight of 
(1 − ߠ) to incorrect inaction, which would occur when the government maintains a neutral stance 
when a counter-cyclical stance would have been appropriate (type II error). Finally, we consider that 
the government attaches a weight of ߛ ∈ ሾ0,1ሿ to the possibility of a downside risk in its real-time 
assessment, and a weight of (1 − ߛ) to the possibility of an upside risk in the real-time assessment. 
Normalising ℓ = 1, we can characterise the loss of the government as follows: 
ܮቀ݀(ܱܩ௧ோ), ݎ(ܱܩ௧)ቁ =
ە
ۖۖ
۔
ۖۖ
ۓ        0                                    ݂݅ ݀ = ݎ                                                           (1 − ߠ)ߛ                       ݂݅ ݀ = ′݊݁ݑݐݎ݈ܽ′ ܽ݊݀ ݎ = ′ݏݐ݅݉ݑ݈ݑݏ′
                  (1 − ߠ)(1 − ߛ)           ݂݅ ݀ = ′݊݁ݑݐݎ݈ܽ′ ܽ݊݀ ݎ = ′ܿ݋݊ݏ݋݈݅݀ܽݐ݅݋݊′
        ߠ(1 − ߛ)                       ݂݅ ݀ = ′ݏݐ݅݉ݑ݈ݑݏ′ ܽ݊݀ ݎ = ′݊݁ݑݐݎ݈ܽ′
                   ߠߛ                                 ݂݅ ݀ =ᇱ ܿ݋݊ݏ݋݈݅݀ܽݐ݅݋݊ᇱܽ݊݀ ݎ =  ′݊݁ݑݐݎ݈ܽ′
                   2ߠߛ                              ݂݅ ݀ = ′ܿ݋݊ݏ݋݈݅݀ܽݐ݅݋݊′ ܽ݊݀ ݎ = ′ݏݐ݅݉ݑ݈ݑݏ′
                   2ߠ(1 − ߛ)                  ݂݅ ݀ = ′ݏݐ݅݉ݑ݈ݑݏ′ ܽ݊݀ ݎ = ′ܿ݋݊ݏ݋݈݅݀ܽݐ݅݋݊′
  
The loss function can be also represented as a matrix (Table 5). 
Table 5: The loss function of the government 
   Real-time decision of the government  
   Stimulus Neutral Consolidation 
   ܱܩ௧ோ < ߬ଵ ߬ଵ ≤ ܱܩ௧ோ ≤ ߬ଶ ܱܩ௧ோ > ߬ଶ 
Reaction 
desired ex-
post  
Stimulus ܱܩ௧ < −0.5% 0 (1 − ߠ)ߛ 2ߠߛ 
Neutral −0.5% ≤ ܱܩ௧ ≤ 0.5% ߠ(1 − ߛ) 0 ߠߛ 
Consolidation ܱܩ௧ > 0.5% 2ߠ(1 − ߛ) (1 − ߠ)(1 − ߛ) 0 
Figure 3 illustrates the policy trade-off that the policymaker faces when deciding on whether 
undertaking stabilisation policies, based on an observed level of the real-time output gap. A 
policymaker may behave cautiously, and therefore decide to stabilise the economy only after 
observing very large values for the output gap in real-time (i.e. choosing a pair of thresholds ߬ଵ and ߬ଶ 
that are far apart). In this case, it is more likely that the stabilisation policies taken will be correct ex-
post, but at the same time such behaviour would result in a level of stabilisation that is much lower 
than what the policymaker desires. The opposite would happen to an activist policymaker (i.e. one 
who chooses a pair of thresholds ߬ଵ and ߬ଶ that are close): in this case, it is more likely that the 
stabilisation needs of the economy are identified, but at the same time it is less likely that specific 
policy interventions will be correct ex-post. Both extremes, excess caution or excess activism, would 
result in a degree of economic stabilisation which is lower than what the policymaker desires based 
on its reaction function.  
Among all the possible decision functions as described in equation (4), the policymaker needs to take 
the one which minimises the loss, and which is closest to the desired reaction function in equation 
(2). Since the government’s decision is a function of the assumed state of the economy, which in turn 
is determined based on the real-time estimate of the output gap, the choice of the government is 
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ultimately to determine the optimal pair (߬ଵ, ߬ଶ) which constitutes the real-time thresholds for policy 
intervention.  
Figure 4 shows the optimal real-time thresholds (߬ଵ, ߬ଶ) calculated for output gap estimates based 
on the production function methodology (left panel) or on the HP filter (right panel). In both cases, 
we consider three possible weights ߛ that the government may attach to downside risks, indicated by 
three different colours. The thresholds (߬ଵ, ߬ଶ) are a function of the weight ߠ attached to type I 
errors.  
Figure 3: Policy trade-off faced by the government when choosing the optimal pair of real-time output gap 
estimates above (or below) which to implement a fiscal consolidation (or a fiscal stimulus). 
Note: This chart considers a government that wishes to implement countercyclical fiscal policies when the output gap is 
outside the interval comprised between -0.5% and +0.5% of GDP. The x-axis shows the pair of real-time output gap 
estimates above (or below) which the government actually decides to intervene in real-time. The solid blue line indicates 
how many stabilisation interventions are correct ex-post, out of all the stabilisation interventions which are taken in real-
time. Alternatively, the solid line shows the probability that an extreme level of the real-time output gap (i.e. a level which 
is outside the interval indicated on the x-axis) is also extreme ex-post (i.e. is outside the interval between -0.5% and +0.5% 
of GDP). The dotted blue line shows how many stabilisation interventions are taken in real-time, out of all the stabilisation 
interventions which are needed ex-post. Alternatively, the dotted line shows how many real-time output gaps appear 
extreme in real time (i.e. outside of the interval indicated on the x-axis) as a share of all the output gaps which are 
considered extreme ex-post (i.e. which are outside the interval between -0.5% and +0.5% of GDP). 
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Figure 4: Loss-minimising thresholds of real-time output gap estimates for considering fiscal stabilisation 
Based on the production function methodology Based on the HP filter 
Note: On the y-axis, this figure shows the upper and lower thresholds for real-time estimates of the output gap outside 
which the government will consider implementing countercyclical fiscal policies. The thresholds are calculated for output 
gap estimates based on the production function methodology (left panel) and on the HP filter (right panel). They are a 
function of the weight θ attached to type I errors (shown on the x-axis in percent). The three colours indicate three 
possible weights γ that the government may attach to downside risks, i.e. the risk that the economy will turn out to be 
worse than expected.  
Towards the left of each graph, the government attributes a lower weight to type I errors than to 
type II errors, that is, it does not want to miss a chance to stabilise the economy, even if this implies a 
risk of unnecessary interventions. In these cases, the two thresholds ߬ଵ and ߬ଶ are equal to each 
other: the government will always consider intervening, unless the output gap has this particular 
value. For any output gap above this threshold, the government will consider adopting a restrictive 
fiscal stance, and for any output gap below the threshold, it will consider implementing a fiscal 
expansion.  
Moving gradually towards the right side of each graph, the weight attributed to type I errors 
increases and the government becomes less interventionist. The lines representing ߬ଵ (below) and ߬ଶ 
(above) diverge. For real-time output gaps below ߬ଵ, the government will choose an expansionary 
fiscal stance; for output gaps above ߬ଶ, it will consolidate; and, in between, it will adopt a neutral 
fiscal stance. At the right end of the graphs, the government above all wants to avoid wrong 
interventions and prefers to keep a neutral fiscal stance even for very large negative or positive 
values of the output gap. 
When the output gap is based on the production function approach, the threshold which triggers 
fiscal stimulus for an interventionist government is well below zero. This is consistent with our 
finding that this method systematically results in a negative bias for output gap estimates in real 
time. A rational policymaker should take this information into account and expect that a small 
negative output gap in real time may well lead, in hindsight, to the conclusion that the economy was 
at potential or in good times. By contrast, when the HP filter is considered, the threshold for which 
an interventionist government undertakes fiscal stimulus is close to zero: this reflects the lower bias 
in HP-filtered output gaps.  
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Under both measures of the output gap, Figure 4 indicates that the thresholds for optimal policy 
interventions begin to widen only when the weight attributed to type I errors becomes significant, 
i.e. for very cautious policy makers. Furthermore, the upper threshold for active policy is less smooth 
under both measures of the output gap, because positive values for the real-time output gap tend to 
be rarer than negative ones.   
The thresholds also depend on the cost that the government attributes to downside risks, i.e. the risk 
that the economic situation turns out worse than expected. The blue lines in Figure 3 assume that 
the government attaches equal importance to downside and upside risks. In the case of the 
production function approach, if the government is more concerned about downside risks (red lines), 
it will be more tempted to take small negative values of real-time estimates at face value and decide 
to support the economy. Conversely, if the government is more concerned about positive growth 
surprises (green lines), it will require an even more negative output gap to support the economy. 
When using the HP filter, the ordering of the red, blue and green lines is the same, but with smaller 
differences s because the bias in the real-time estimate is more limited. In particular, a government 
that is concerned of being too optimistic and wishes to avoid negative growth surprises (red lines) 
would undertake a fiscal stimulus based on roughly the same output gap as a government with 
balanced expectations about the state of the economy (blue lines). 
These results explain how governments basing their decisions on real-time output gaps estimates 
may end up implementing pro-cyclical fiscal policies. In real time, providing fiscal stimulus to the 
economy when the output gap is slightly negative may seem to be the right decision. With hindsight, 
however, this is likely to be a wrong choice as the economic situation is likely to have been 
underestimated. One reason why policymakers may still make this decision is that, even if they are 
aware of the pessimistic bias of real-time output gap estimates, because they  have a preference for 
mitigating recessions rather than for stabilising the economy in a symmetric manner. This 
asymmetric behaviour may then reflect strategic reasons, such as not upsetting voters with tax hikes 
and lower public spending in good economic times.  
From an economic policy perspective our findings raise the question of why voters do not penalise  
an activist behaviour coupled with inattention toward economic booms. Among the many alternative 
explanations provided in the literature (see for instance Drazen, 2000) we would like to highlight one 
in particular namely the asymmetry of information. Voters may simply not have sufficient 
information to judge the motives and performance of policy makers which stresses the importance 
of having independent fiscal institutions to enhance transparency and, in turn, the accountability of 
policy makers.  
 
6. Conclusions 
This paper assumes that fiscal policymakers seeking to maximise social welfare will consider running 
counter-cyclical fiscal policies when the economy is in bad or good times, using the output gap as an 
indicator of the cyclical situation. However, the output gap is particularly challenging to measure in 
real time as it relies both on forecasts and non-observables, and in hindsight real-time estimates 
often turn out to differ from the ‘true’ output gap. Uncertainty around cyclical conditions in real time 
gives rise to two types of errors. On the one hand, governments may wrongly believe that the 
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economy is in a downturn and needs fiscal stimulus – or, conversely, that it is overheating and calls 
for fiscal retrenchment – while in reality the economy is close to its potential. We describe as type I 
error the decision to incorrectly undertake counter-cyclical fiscal policies when a neutral fiscal stance 
would rather be warranted. Conversely, governments may believe there is no slack in the economy 
and that there is no need to intervene, while the economy is actually in a downturn, or overheating, 
and would benefit from fiscal stabilisation. We label the failure to provide counter-cyclical fiscal 
support or restraint as type II error. 
To reduce the costs associated with uncertainty, fiscal policymakers can take into account past 
forecast errors when considering fiscal stabilisation measures. Based on observations in EU countries 
between 2003 and 2017, we show that the estimates based on the production function approach, 
used for fiscal surveillance in the EU, tend to be too pessimistic throughout the cycle. Rational fiscal 
policymakers should correct for this bias to avoid pro-cyclical policies. In particular, they should 
consider stimulating the economy only when they see a significantly negative output gap in real time, 
while they should take a small negative real-time output gap as a sign that the ‘true’ output gap is 
not necessarily negative but rather likely to be close to zero or even positive. The time may then be 
ripe for building up fiscal buffers rather than spending them. 
We also analyse real-time output gap estimates based on the HP filter. We find that they also tend to 
underestimate good times, which is consistent with earlier findings that conventional measures of 
the output gap fail to capture episodes of overheating induced by credit booms. However, during 
episodes of downturns, with the exception of outright recessions, the HP filter tend to behave 
differently from the production function method. While the production function approach still 
displays a negative bias in real time during downturns, the HP filter does not. This greater symmetry 
in the HP filter may be explained by its tendency to be more pro-cyclical, thus better capturing the 
impact of permanent growth shocks. By being more stable, potential output estimates derived from 
the production function method may, on the other hand, tend to overestimate the size of economic 
downturns in response to large and persistent recessions.  
The government’s decision depends on the relative weight it attributes to the risks of making type I 
and type II errors. A government that does not want to miss a chance to stabilise the economy will 
only adopt a neutral fiscal stance for a very narrow range of output gaps, even if this implies a risk of 
unnecessary or pro-cyclical interventions outside this range. On the other hand, a government 
seeking to avoid wrong interventions will maintain a neutral fiscal stance unless the output gap takes 
very large negative or positive values. 
Finally, we underline the consequences of asymmetric preferences with respect to mitigating 
downside and upside growth risks. Past research observing that fiscal policies tend to be pro-cyclical 
ex-post, but not in real time, seems to suggest that governments simply do not correctly take into 
account the risks and biases involved in real-time assessments of the state of the economy. An 
alternative explanation that could rationalise such a behaviour would assume that governments have 
a stronger aversion to downside risks to the growth outlook than to upside risks. This would prompt 
policymakers to ignore or possibly explain the pessimistic bias of real time output gap estimates.  
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